1.1 这种做法是其中之一（参见 附录X1 )旨在协助核设施运营商满足监管机构设定的金属检测性能要求。 1.2 本规程包括四个程序，用于评估穿行金属探测器的厂内性能（参见 图1 ). 图1 走查金属探测器评估测试程序 注1: 一系列检测灵敏度验证测试的数量、每次测试的通过次数、验收标准和频率可由监管机构确定，或由安全组织根据威胁场景或漏洞评估进行设置；数字应足以提供与探测器应用相称的保证程度。 注2: 如果探测器不符合验收标准，则终止验证系列。然后必须测试探测器，以重新建立检测概率。如果无法满足检测概率要求（可能需要维修），则必须映射检测器并重新建立操作灵敏度设置。然后可以从新的检测灵敏度测试开始恢复性能测试。 注3: 如果探测器未通过功能测试，则必须立即停止使用探测器（参见 附录X1 ). 1.2.1 其中两个程序提供了评估检测概率的数据。这些程序使用二项式数据（报警/非报警）。 1.2.1.1 检测灵敏度测试（DST；参见 注1 )是检测概率评估序列中的初始过程。 它用于在探测器调整到其操作灵敏度设置后立即确定检测概率。 注1: DST是用于评估检测率的两种程序之一。另一种是检测灵敏度验证测试（DSVT）。在评估测试策略中，DST用于最初确定并记录检测率，然后DSVT用于定期检查检测率是否继续满足要求。 1.2.1.2 检测灵敏度验证测试（DSVT；参见 注1 )该程序定期提供数据，用于评估连续检测性能。 1.2.2 第三个程序是“功能测试”它通常用于验证金属探测器是否正在运行，并在出现应引起警报的情况时以正确的音频和视频信号作出响应。 1.2.3 第四个程序用于验证检测灵敏度测试期间产生的警报可能是金属检测的结果，而不是由外部干扰或测试人员体重对检测场的扰动引起的。 1.2.3.1 该程序也可用于确定假警报的发生概率，例如，20次测试通过一个干净的测试仪，结果没有警报，表明在95时的假警报概率小于0.15 % 信心除非监管机构要求，否则本程序为可选程序。 1.3 本规程未设定测试对象规范。规范应由监管机构发布。 1.4 这种做法既不是为了设置性能级别，也不是为了限制或约束技术。 1.5 本规程不涉及与使用穿行金属探测器相关的安全或操作问题。 1.6 本国际标准是根据世界贸易组织技术性贸易壁垒（TBT）委员会发布的《关于制定国际标准、指南和建议的原则的决定》中确立的国际公认标准化原则制定的。 ====意义和用途====== 7.1 穿行金属探测器是搜索隐蔽金属武器和SNM（特殊核材料）屏蔽材料的有效且不引人注目的手段。探测器通常用于防止未经授权的武器进入设施，以及盗窃或未经授权移除SNM。 金属探测器的日常功能测试表明，它们正在运行，并将产生正确的报警信号；大量使用频率较低的厂内评估提供了数据，用于确定探测器是否在预期性能水平下运行。 7.2 本规程提供了一套程序系统，用于评估穿行金属探测器的检测性能。 7.3 程序规定了用于建立、跟踪和审计金属探测器性能和操作的记录和使用的数据。 7.4 这种做法建议记录性能记录。 附录X4 提供用于记录和跟踪探测器操作和性能测试的表格示例。

1.1 This practice is one of several (see Appendix X1 ) developed to assist operators of nuclear facilities with meeting the metal detection performance requirements set by regulatory authorities. 1.2 This practice consists of four procedures useful for evaluating the in-plant performance of walk-through metal detectors (see Fig. 1 ). FIG. 1 Walk-through Metal Detector Evaluation Testing Program Note 1: The number of detection sensitivity verification tests in a series, the number of passes per test, the acceptance criteria, and the frequency may be established by regulatory authority or set by the security organization based on threat scenarios or vulnerability assessments; the numbers should be sufficient to provide a degree of assurance commensurate with the detector application. Note 2: If the detector fails to meet the acceptance criteria, the verification series is terminated. The detector then must be tested to reestablish the probability of detection. If the probability of detection requirement cannot be met (repairs may be necessary), the detector must be mapped and the operational sensitivity setting reestablished. Performance testing can then be resumed starting with a new detection sensitivity test. Note 3: If the detector fails the functional test, the detector must be immediately removed from service (see Appendix X1 ). 1.2.1 Two of the procedures provide data for evaluating probability of detection. These procedures use binomial data (alarm/not alarm). 1.2.1.1 The detection sensitivity test (DST; see Note 1 ) is the initial procedure in the detection probability evaluation series. It is used to establish the probability of detection immediately after the detector has been adjusted to its operational sensitivity setting. Note 1: The DST is one of two procedures used to evaluate detection rate. The Detection Sensitivity Verification Test (DSVT) is the other. In the evaluation test strategy, the DST is used to initially determine and document the detection rate and then the DSVT is used to periodically check that the detection rate continues to meet the requirements. 1.2.1.2 The detection sensitivity verification test (DSVT; see Note 1 ) procedure periodically provides data for evaluation of continuing detection performance. 1.2.2 The third procedure is a “functional test.” It is used routinely to verify that a metal detector is operating and responds with the correct audio and visual signals when subjected to a condition that should cause an alarm. 1.2.3 The fourth procedure is used to verify that alarms generated during detection sensitivity testing were likely the result of the detection of metal and not caused by outside interferences or the perturbation of the detection field by the tester's body mass. 1.2.3.1 This procedure also can be used to establish a probability of occurrence for false alarms, for example, 20 test passes by a clean-tester resulting in no alarms indicates a false alarm probability of less than 0.15 at 95 % confidence. This procedure is optional unless required by the regulatory authority. 1.3 This practice does not set test object specifications. The specifications should be issued by the regulatory authority. 1.4 This practice is intended neither to set performance levels nor to limit or constrain technologies. 1.5 This practice does not address safety or operational issues associated with the use of walk-through metal detectors. 1.6 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee. ====== Significance And Use ====== 7.1 Walk-through metal detectors are an effective and unobtrusive means for searching for concealed metallic weapons and SNM (special nuclear material) shielding material. The detectors are generally applied to prevent the unauthorized entry of weapons into facilities, and theft or unauthorized removal of SNM. Daily functional testing of metal detectors shows that they are operating and will produce the correct alarm signal; the significant use of less frequent in-plant evaluations provides data from which to determine if detectors are operating at expected performance levels. 7.2 This practice provides a system of procedures for evaluating the detection performance of walk-through metal detectors. 7.3 The procedures specify data to be recorded and used for establishing, tracking, and auditing metal detector performance and operation. 7.4 This practice suggests documentation for maintaining performance records. Appendix X4 provides examples of forms for recording and tracking detector operation and performance testing.